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CHINESE TURKESTAN
BY OWEN LATTIMORE
SIN-KEA.NG (Hsin-chianq-, the New Erontier) or Chinese Turki-
stan, like Manchuria, AfongoHa, and Tihet, is a part of the en-
circling land frontier of China. Its history and its modern prob-
lems are inseparable from those of China, yet always distinct. It
has been the regular historical practice to treat all of these border
countries, which are not quite dependencies and not truly nations,
as the proper field for the expansion of Chinese influences. This
does not give the whole picture. Actually, periods of Chinese ex-
pansion have alternated with periods when 'the power of the
frontier barbarians extended into China.
"Chinese" dynasties "ruling" the border ])arbarians have fre-
quently been established by the barbarians themselves, either as the
result of open invasion or through the alliance of tribesmen beyond
the Great Wall with political factions in China. The barbarian dy-
nasties became Chinese, and the capitals remained in China ; but
power often remained in the hands of the still barbarian tribesmen.
The frontier tended to rule the country. Erom this arises the para-
dox that the periods of maximum expansion of Chinese influence
and culture beyond the Great Wall are not necessarily the periods
in which the frontier dominated China, taking from China, in the
way of cultural influences, not what was imposed on it but what it
wanted. This is true even of the great Han dynasty (206 b.c-
A.D. 220). The real Han expansion stopped at the outer Great Wall
systems ; the activities of its most able statesmen and generals in
Central Asia were not the result of genuine conquest, but were made
possible by adroit manipulation of the diiTerent Central Asian
peoples.
Another characteristic of the frontier as a whole is its division
into an "inner" and an "outer" region. This division is most ob-
vious in Inner and Outer IMongolia ; but the same structure exists
in Manchuria, Central Asia, and Tibet. Briefly, it may be said of
this "inner" and "outer" structure that the "inner" region is more
closely associated with China, alternately as the garrison-territory
of barbarians holding power in China, or as the outpost-region of
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Chinese power beyond the Great Wall in periods of Chinese ascen-
dency. The "outer" region is that which less frequently took part
in direct assaults on China, and was less affected by Chinese con-
trol in the periods of reaction. Chinese Turkistan belongs to the
'"outer" sphere, and unless this is clearly apprehended its relation
to China cannot properly be appreciated. The important Moslem
"pale" in western Kansu province stands to Chinese Turkistan as
Inner IMongolia to Outer Mongolia, and graduates in the same way
the interaction of China and Chinese Turkistan on each other.
It is against this historical background that Chinese Turkistan
must be considered. The province, which is really a group of "na-
tive protectorates," has been closely linked with China from the
time of the Han dynasty, when a great silk traffic through the Cen-
tral Asian deserts brought the empires of China and Rome into
remote relation and when Central Asia was the key to the foreign
policies of China. In the succeeding two thousand years, however,
Chinese authority over what is now Sin-kiang has only been opera-
tive during some 425 years, i divided into several periods, of which
the present Chinese overlordship is the fifth important period.
The present geographical boundaries of Chinese Turkistan, and
its tribal and administrative organization, follow the lines laid down
under the Manchu or Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911). Although nomi-
nally determined by Manchu conquest, they were actually the result,
in the main, of the advantage taken by the iNIanchus of internecine
wars among the tribes themselves. At the time when the Manchus
conquered China, the whole frontier region, from Tibet to the Pa-
cific, was riven bv war. The gravest preoccupation of the Manchus
was the prevention, within the frontier region, of the rise of any
tribal power that might rival their own. They accomplished their
aim only in very small measure by direct conquest. They relied
chiefly on setting one tribal element against another, coming for-
ward as arbitrators when the different rivals were exhausted by lo-
cal warfare, and arranging settlements on the basis of tribal "spheres
of interest" and the acceptance of the Manchu liouse as nominal
overlord by each pair of combatants. The element of compromise
in these nominal conquests is revealed by the fact that the "tribute"
to the cui])eror was regularly offset by handsome subsidies and
presents to the ])rinccs and chiefs.
IC. P. Skrinc, Chinese Central .Lua, London. 1928.
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At the time of the Chinese revohition in 1911, the position held
by the Manchus passed to the Chinese. The fall of the empire
prompted a series of outbreaks in Chinese Turkistan, which were
cut short by the emergence of a single able individual, a Chinese
(not native to the province) named Yang Tseng-hsin. He succeeded
in effecting what was virtually a confirmation of the status quo,
with the government transferred from imperial appointees to a Chin-
ese civil service, which maintained the general services of the prov-
ince and continued to hold the old balance between the different
tribal, racial, and religious elements. The government was composed
in the first instance of Chinese who had served under the Manchus,
and has since hardened into a group of office-holding families, which
recruit new members only with caution. While, therefore, China
has been struggling for twenty-one years with the inevitable re-
sults of the revolution, Chinese Turkistan has lived almost com-
pletely at peace, by virtue of avoiding every implication of the
revolution, under what amounts to the fiction that the revolution
never occurred.
The Chinese governing minority in Sin-kiang is comparable to
the British element in India ; but with the difference that there is
no valid connection between the government of Chinese Turkistan
and the government of China. They are sundered by the "inner
frontier" of Moslem Kansu. The power of the Chinese in Turki-
stan is largely a fiction, and in so far as it is real is maintained not
by the real strength of the Chinese themselves, but by playing off
against one another the dift"erent subject populations—Moslems
against Lama-Buddhists, nomads against settled peoples, towns
against country districts. The compactness of the Moslems as the
most important minority is discounted by the hostility of sects. Is-
lam, as the "protestantism" of the Middle Eastern religions, has
the protestant characteristic of splitting into innumerable sects. Un-
der the lulled rhythm of all life in Central Asia, so long as
economic conditions and general political relations are reasonably
tranquil, the quarrels of religious sects are not primary causes of
disturbance ; but they are nevertheless constantly in dispute, and
when other conditions combine to precipitate war, they flare up
vigorously. It is the incompatibility of sects that prevents cohesion
both within the Moslem "pale" of Kansu and the Moslem popu-
lation of Chinese Turkistan, and has enabled the Chinese to keep the
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upper hand: it has hcen the ruin of each of the great ^Muhammadan
rebelHons.
The province of Sin-kiang has an area of roughly 400,000 square
miles (about twice the size of the pre-war German empire) of which
the greater part is desert. The population is probably about two mil-
lion, which may include between one and two hundred thousand
Chinese : but not even roughly accurate figures are available. Ex-
ternally its frontiers are well defined by mountains and deserts
;
the commanding internal features are the great southern and cen-
tral desert of the Taklamakan, the northern desert of Jungaria,
and the T'ien-shan range. This range forms a kind of backbone
to the country, and is roughly the historical frontier between
nomads on the north and settled peoples on the south. The main
precipitation of rainfall is on the north, and for this reason there
has always been a corridor of migration along the pasture belts on
the northern side of the T'ien-shan, linking ^Mongolia and
Russian Central Asia.
South of the T'ien-shan the rainfall is insufficient to support con-
tinuous grazing. The water supply depends chiefly on the rivers
which come down from the crests of the high ranges—the Kun-
lun and Karakorum ranges on the south as well as the T'ien-shan
on the north. Nomads live in the upper mountains, but the regular
mountain formation is one in which an arid foothill range is in-
terposed between the main range and the plains, acting as a barrier
between the nomads and the people of the oases. Where the streams
issue from the foothill range it is possible to spread the water out
fanwise through irrigation systems, to form an oasis of great fer-
tility. This accounts for agricultural conditions of extraordinary
stability, because the water, depending not on rainfall but on the
melting of snows and glaciers, becomes most plentiful when it is
most needed. Speaking in general, there are two periods of abun-
dant water ; one in the spring, when the snow melts in the lower
hills, and one in summer when the thaw extends to the highest snows
and the glaciers. This greatly favors the growth of cotton (the
most important export crop), as well as the grapes, melons, and
other fruits, for which the oases are fatuous.
Thus, the economic geography of the c«nintr\, with which racial
grou])ing closely corresponds, may be summarized as follows: an
inner backbone range of high mountains, with jicaks rising to
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about 24,000 feet ; an outer range of desert mountains, and an ir-
rigated oasis at each point where a stream from the inner moun-
tains issues by a difficult gorge through the barrier-range. Below
the oasis the water of the stream runs to waste, vanishing in the
desert or ending in reed-beds, meres, or lakes, in the Taklamakan
desert in southern Chinese Turkistan or the Jungarian desert in
Jungaria or northern Chinese Turkistan. In these terminal basins
and reed-beds there are zones of grazing land ; but these, in south-
ern Chinese Turkistan, are separated by desert ga])s which impede
nomadic migration.
In southern Chinese Turkistan, therefore, population is distrib-
uted vertically, from the low-lying reed-beds to the oases, and so
up through the barrier mountains into the main ranges. Lateral
communication is difficult. The oases are connected, like beads on
a string, by an arterial road following the foot of the hills. Local
trade is between the plain and the mountains, with the oasis-town
as center of distribution and of the petty manufactures which meet
most local needs. The arterial road, therefore, serves in the main
only for the export of such surplus as can be taken entirely out of
the country ; since to transport it to an exactly similar neighbor-
ing oasis would be useless.
Under modern conditions the chief exports are cotton, wool,
hides, furs, small amounts of gold and jade, and the raisins that
have been a delicacy in China ever since the introduction of the
grape in the Han dynasty. The imports are silks, tea, piece-goods,
and a certain number of sundry goods. Generally speaking, not use-
ful goods but luxuries are the most profitable to import ; the smaller
the bulk and weight, and the higher the value, the more chance of
profit, because of the great distances over which goods have to be
transported. The movement of culture, historically, has been paral-
lel to that of trade. There has been a marked tendency to import
the incidental aspects, rather than the basic values, of Chinese cul-
ture. In more ancient times, the luxury class of trade was even
more important. Practically the only exports of Chinese Turkistan
were gold, jade, and horses of specially fine breed, while the im-
ports were silk and tea : and probably, from the \A'est, weapons of
superior make.
There have been two great arterial trade routes, each with its
minor variations, in southern Chinese Turkistan : the Lop-nor route.
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now abandoned in part, and the T'ien-shan Xan Lu, the Road South
of the Heavenly ]\Iountains. This, the great route of the present
day, enters Sin-kiang from Kansu and passes from Hami (Komul)
to Urumchi, which is actually north of the T'ien-shan. Then it
passes back to the south of the mountains and runs through Tur-
fan, Toksun, Karashahr, Korla, Kuchar, Aksu, and ]\Iaralbashi to
Kashgar. Here it joins the western terminal half of the Lop-nor
route, which now survives chiefly as an internal trade route, not
communicating with China but running from Lop-nor along the
foot of the Kunlun and Karakorum, through Keriya, Khotan, and
Yarkand to Kashgar.
These two roads link together the oases of the agricultural
eastern Central Asian Turks—the Turki, called by the Chinese
Ch'an-t'ou or Turbaned Heads. Among the Turki are also found
(chieflv in the cities) a Chinese population; the T'ung-kan or Dun-
gan, a settled Moslem people probably of mixed Chinese and Turk-
ish blood : and a few minor peoples, such as the Dulani and the
Lopliks. In the mountains back of the trade routes are found such
peoples as the Kazaks (nomadic Central Asian Turks) in the Kar-
lik Tagh, a part of the T'ien-shan, north of Hami ; the Mongols,
north of Karashar in the Yulduz region of the central T'ien-shan
;
and the Kirghiz (another division of nomadic Central Asian Turks)
in the western T'ien-shan and in the Karakorum and Kunlun. In
the mountains south of Kashgar there are also the Sarikolis, a
sedentary people, related to the Tajiks of the highlands of Rus-
sian Central Asia.
The chief center of Chinese population is Urumchi, capital and
nodal point of the province. The Chinese diminish rapidly in num-
bers along the road to Kashgar, but are fairly numerous in the Hi
region. As agricultural settlers they are most important in the lat-
ter, but they are also found in some of the oases between Urum-
chi and Hi, and around Chuguchak. For the most part, however,
they are city dwellers ; large traders handling the long-distance cara-
van trade, jietty traders retailing imports from China, members of
the government services, and military officers. As private soldiers
the Chinese are the poorest material in the province ; they are very
consciously the ruling race, and it is so easy for a man of any
industry and intelligence to make a good living that as a class they
feel themselves above the bad pay of the soldier. As a rule, there-
fore, it is only the worthless and incompetent am(ing the Chinese
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URUMCHI FROM A TEMPLE ON THE HILL
Photograph by Owen Lattimore
who enlist ; the best troops in the province are Mongols, largely
under their own officers, and Moslems under Chinese officers.
While southern Chinese Turkistan is the classical land of the
great silk trade routes, northern Chinese Turkistan, or Jungaria, is
the land of the migration routes. It is known to the Chinese as
T'ien-shan Pei Lu, the Road North of the Heavenly Mountains,
because of the main route which, diverging from the South Road
at Urumchi, runs westward into Russian Central Asia. This route
divides at Hsihu, about halfway to the Russian frontier, into two
branches ; one which enters Russian Turkistan by the Hi Valley,
and one which enters southern Siberia by Chuguchak, in the Emil
Valley.
Jungaria is named from the Jungar, the Left or East Wing of
the great confederation of Western Mongols, who in the seven-
teenth century came very near to winning the mastery over all
Mongolia, and would in that case have seriously challenged the
Manchus in the conquest of China. Owing to disagreements among
the Western Mongols themselves, a large body broke away, mi-
grating through Russian Central Asia to the A olga. Some seventy
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years later most of these migrated Mongols returned to Chinese
Tnrkistan, by arrangement with the Alanchiis ; those who remained
on the \'olga are the Russian Kalmuks of the present day. This
double migration is important in history because it is the last of the
great Mongol migrations, involving really large numbers and really
great distances. It is also important because it reveals how the
Manchu dominion in Chinese Turkistan, which was later claimed
as a direct conquest, was founded actually on diplomatic manipula-
tion of the different racial and tribal groups, after the Mongols
had already overrun the whole country and then quarreled among
themselves.
The geographical structure of the communities along the North
Road is comparable to that of the South Road. There is the same
string of oases, with its background of mountains. There is, how-
ever, one cardinal difference, in that the string of oases is dominated
by a line of country suitable for uninterrupted nomadic migration.
The power of the nomads is reinforced by a route running along
the flanks of the x'Mtai, north of the Jtmgarian desert and converg-
ing on the North Road ; it forms a corridor from Mongolia, through
the Tarbagatai region and the Emil A^alley, into Russian Central
Asia and southern Siberia.
Because it lay open to nomad incursions, the social-economic
oasis-structure of the North Road was periodically overwhelmed by
invasions, and the growth of society and civilization was much less
continuous. For this reason the archaeological remains of the North
Road are not so rich as those of the southern oases—apart alto-
gether from the greater dryness of the south, which is comparable
to that of Egypt in favoring the preservation of ruins and the
objects in them. Conquests of the southern oases must normally
have been effected by indirect approach from the North Road. Who-
ever holds the North Road has comparatively free scope of move-
ment, and by striking across the passes of the T'ien-shan can mas-
ter separately the oases of the South Road ; which though to a high
degree uniform in race, language, religion, and culture, have no
political cohesion and no sense of united nationality. They are is-
lands, which know of each other but do not belong to each other.
These i^henomena continue to be of importance in our own day, be-
cause the North Road lies open to access from Siberia and Russian
Central Asia, while the approach from China is exceedingly long
and as difficult as it is long.
CHINESE TURKISTAN 105
Freedom of movement and large-scale migration along the North
Road have blurred the local historical outlines. In each oasis
"pocket" of southern Chinese Turkistan the po]iulation tends to
be stable. Each oasis has seen many conquests ; but the conquerors
came in small detachments and imposed only a small ruling class on
top of the local population. Even in the most flourishing ages of
the Silk Route there do not seem to have been sweeping movements
of population. Communities of merchants from all over Asia had
their separate quarters in the prosperous towns ; they brought their
languages and their religions, but they did not, on the whole, dis-
place what they found ; they added to it. Even the Chinese, in the
long period of their modern influence, which began in the seven-
teenth century (under the Manchus), displaced but little. They
represent one more addition ; and both in cjuantity and quality that
addition is remarkably small, west of Hami and Turfan.
Along the North Road, on the other hand, racial and cultural
history tends to be disconnected and confused. It is a succession of
catastrophes and sweeping replacements. In times of strong govern-
ment, settled populations grow up in the oases ; in times of war,
they are obHterated. Sometimes they are replaced immediately
by the conquerors, sometimes they are left desolate for years. Some-
times, even, the remnants of the oasis-people turn nomad. This
is a type of historical change that is too little appreciated, because of
the emphasis given to the changes that take place when nomadic
peoples invade civilized regions and are absorbed in them. Yet the
region north of the Great Wall of China has frequently seen the
conversion of settled people into pastoral nomads.
The Hi Valley, the "promised land" of Chinese Central Asia, is
enclosed between two arms of the T'ien-shan, and opens into what
is now the Kazakistan Soviet Socialist Republic of Russian Central
Asia. It is the richest part of the dominion, but the least developed.
Forests, mines, rich mountain pastures, and fertile arable lands lie
close to one another, but the land has never enjoyed long-continued
development. Cities have been founded only to be destroyed. The
great valley forms a bay into which have eddied racial elements
from each of the migrations that has swept along the Nomads' High-
way between Mongolia and Russian Central Asia. Here are found
Mongols, Kazaks, and Kirghiz ; Taranchis—immigrant settlers from
the Kashgar region ; Solons, Sibos, and Chinese. The Solons and
Sibos came from northern ^vlanchuria, from the region historicallv
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equivalent to Outer Mongolia, and were "planted" as Manchu mili-
tary colonists. They still preserve their Manchu dialects better than
the Manchu language is preserved in Manchuria. The Sairam Nor
approach to the Tli Valley is held by Chahar Mongols in the Bore-
tala Valley. They migrated from the Chahar region of Mongolia,
some 2,000 miles away, under Manchu orders.
Hi at the present time is the most desired goal of immigrants
from China, because its lack of development gives them the maxi-
mum of op])Ortunity. l^v long tradition, however, it is politically
violent and rnstable. Here occurred almost the only massacres of
the town Manchu s and severe fighting during the Chinese revolu-
tion. Frontier conditions are still more uncertain than in any other
part of the province. The political frontier does not accord with
the needs of the nomads. Across the frontier are those of the Ka-
zaks who arc under Russian rule. The Kazaks, although thus politi-
calK (lixidcd and further sul)dividcd into many tribes, are culturally
one nation. It has long been their practice to migrate across the
political boundary at their own discretion ; a practice which their
overlords have always ])rcvented if thc\- could. When they find
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Chinese rule lighter than Russian, there is an inevitahle tendency to
move into Chinese territory, moving back again when conditions
change. During the period of rapid Russian colonization, just be-
fore 1914, and again during the Russian revolution, the migration
was from Russian into Chinese territory. At the present time there
is attempted migration in both directions. Tribesmen who are not
reconciled to the Soviet order try to escape into Chinese territory
:
while others, from the Chinese side, dissatisfied with Chinese rule
and attracted by the growing prestige of Russia, attempt to enter
Russian territory. Russian Kazaks are allowed to carry arms,
while the Chinese do everything in their ])ower to prevent the tribes
under their rule from acquiring modern arms. The frontier is con-
tinually disturbed by surreptitious, forbidden fiittings, and also by
bold thieving raids on the horse-herds, in which the well-armed
tribesmen from the Russian side usually get the better of it.
Finally, there is the Tarbagatai-Altai region, which forms a sort
of outer northwest ward of Chinese territory. A large part of it,
administered from Sharasume (called by the Chinese Ch'eng-hua-
se) is geographically and ethnically part of the Altai region of ^lon-
golia. It was so administered until the Chinese revolution, when
Outer Mongolia declared for and achieved a measure of autonomy.
Many of the Mongols of this region, however, are related to those
established in the T'ien-shan, and under the influence of one of
their princes they adhered to the province of Sin-kiang in prefer-
ence to remaining with Alongolia.
It is precisely in this region that the Altai migration-corridor
converges on the North Road, so that strategically the region is of
the greatest importance. The population, although predominantly
Mongol, contains also a number of Kazaks, of the Altai division of
that group of tribes, and a number of Altai-Urianghai, of a I\Ion-
golized Turkish stock. The Sharasume frontier is a matter of much
concern to the Chinese authorities, who are always afraid that the
influence of Outer Mongolia will cause a rising there, the more
so since the Mongols under Chinese rule in Turkistan have gradual-
ly but obviously been growing less contented with the treatment
they receive.
The province of Sin-kiang and its heterogeneous peoples are
governed, as has already been described, by a small alien minority,
the Chinese, under the fiction that the Chinese are conquerors who
are in a position to vindicate their rule by force and to hold the
108 THE OPEN COURT
province against any insurrection from within or invasion from
without. This fiction has worked admirahly. The government com-
bines local corruption w^ith admirable general efficiency. Its cur-
rency is worthless, yet its economic condition is remarkably steady,
compared not only with China proper but with almost any country
in the world. It is politically, economically, and socially backward,
but probably more stable and contented, at least until very recently,
than any region of equal area in the world. It has dealt success-
fully with the danger of invasion, and handled well a numerous in-
cursion of armed men thrown out of Russia by the revolution. Its
record for civil war during the twenty-one years of the Chinese
republic has been astonishing ; one or two factional crises among
the ruling Chinese and a very few risings among subject peoples
brought about by excessive assertion of authority.
The final paradox is that the government, although nominally it
represents the power of China over a colonial dominion, exhibits
the utmost caution in dealing with the Central Government, and
avoids altogether any implication in the politics of China. It con-
ducts its own foreign relations with Russia and India, and fears
intervention from China at least as much as it fears either foreign
aggression or native rebellion.
Chinese Turkistan is divided from China by great distances
and formidable deserts. There is one great cart-road approach,
through Kansu. The first Republican governor of the province
used to refer to the eighteen stages of desert travel just beyond his
border as his eighteen ten-thousands of loyal troops, protecting him
from Chinese civil wars. Apart from its natural difficulties the
cart-road is frequently closed bv civil war, banditry, or conflict be-
tween the Aloslem and Chinese elements in Kansu. There is one
other main line of approach ; that by the Mongolian caravan routes.
The two or three original caravan routes have been reduced to one
since the secession of Outer Mongolia from China, and the one
remaining route, being accessible at one point from Kansu, has
been almost put out of commission by the extortions of the Kansu
tax-gatherers.
With the trade between the i)ro\ince and China thus reduced,
Soviet Russia has for some years enjoyed a virtual monopoly of
the foreign trade of Chinese Turkistan. The prosperity of foreign
trade is essential to Chinese rule, for so long as their subjects are
prosperous, they arc much less likely to rebel. The importance of
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Russian trade means that the Soviet (Government can exercise great
pressure on the local authorities. I'or this reason, the province in-
dependently opened relations with Russia in 1925, and since then
the Russian consulates have remained open in Turkistan, although
they have heen withdrawn from China proper.
Russian interests also succeeded in opening an experimental mo-
tor traffic between the frontier at Chuguchak and the capital at
Urumchi, in spite of Chinese reluctance. The conservative Chinese
opinion has always been that traffic ought to pass freely within the
province, for the sake of trade ; but not rapidly, because rapid trans-
port would increase the danger of spread of any local insurrection,
and also would benefit Russia more than Turkistan in the event of
conflict. The peculiar attitude of the Chinese toward motor trans-
port is illustrated by the fact that when it was first discussed, no
Chinese were trained as drivers and mechanics. Only "natives"
were to be employed. It was feared that if Chinese were employed,
they might be tempted to meddle in politics, since control of the
motor transport would be of grave importance in the event of a
political crisis. Since then the attitude toward motor services has
been modified by the desire to revive trade with China at least enough
to break down the Russian economic domination. Attempts are now
being made to develop a motor route through Inner Mongolia, but
they are much hampered by political difficulties and sandy deserts.
The difficulties of Chinese traders at present are acute. Being
almost cut ofif from markets in China, they become little more than
middlemen between the natives and the Russians. In Turkistan,
as elsewhere, the Russians prefer to work through monopoly firms.
As each firm has no competitor in its area, the Chinese and native
merchants dealing with Russia have to take what is ofifered for
their exports and pay what is demanded for their imports. It is
for this reason that Russian political influence, which is strong in
Outer Mongolia and intermittently evident in Manchuria, is nor-
mally suspended in Turkistan. The Russians can buy and sell in
what is practically a closed market, which is of the highest impor-
tance to them, since Russia is in need of foreign trade, but can
only trade in an open market at the cost of great sacrifice.
In Kashgar, Yarkand. and Khotan there is a limited trade with
India. It is, however, hardly likely to expand to any important ex-
tent, because of the enormous physical difficulties of crossing the
mountain barriers. There is, however, a certain amount of cultural
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influence from India and an important pilgrim traffic. Pilgrims to
Mecca, who used to go chiefly through Russian Turkistan, now go
through India. In actual trade, however, conditions are so awk-
ward that Indian traders invest a great part of their profits in
money-lending : with the result that probably the most important
function of the British consular officials in Turkistan—with the
exception of the diplomatic benefits of proximity to their Russian
colleagues—is to attend to friction arising out of lawsuits between
Indian money-lenders and Chinese subjects.
The financial arrangements of Chinese Turkistan are extraor-
dinary. It has long been the practice in China for the provincial
authorities, usually under the control of the military, to debase the
currency by demanding good money in payment of taxes and is-
suing fiduciary currency, which rapidly depreciates, in paying troops
and settling other obligations. This is possible largely because of
banking arrangements which allow the officials to remit their profits
to safe places in Shanghai and the foreign concessions. This is not
possible in Sin-kiang, because the province has no banks, no banking
connection with China proper, and no money in use that passes
current in China. The only way in which either officials or private
individuals can transfer any important sum to China is to export
goods and bank the proceeds of the sale. For this reason, most of-
ficials are interested in trading firms and therefore in the pros-
perity of trade generally. Even within the province 'several dift'erent
regional currencies are in use. and this tends to stabilize political
conditions ; for it is almost impossible to accumulate sufficient cash
funds in any one place to finance a political venture, without
detection.
The progress of "sinization" has been and still is extremely slow.
Higher culture, it is true, and such higher technical development as
exists are predominantly Chinese.
''Do you smelt copper here?" "No, we don't know how, but the
Chinese do." This conversation, recorded as typical by Huntington-
a quarter of a century ago, is still typical. "The people do not
seem to care to learn to do anything new," says Huntington. "They
might learn much from their Chinese masters, but no one has suf-
ficient ambition." 1 luntington deals with the characters of the Cen-
tral .Asian peoples in relation to their environments. There is, how-
ever, 1 think, another important factor to be considered. The same
-Ellsvvorlli lluntin|:;t()n, 'J'lic I'lilsc of .Isia, Boston, 1907.
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indifference to "progress
and civilization" as taught
by the Chinese is noticeable
throughout the frontier re-
gions. It has, I think, part-
ly an historical basis, in the
privileged position so often
held by the border peoples.
They tend to accept the
benefits made available to
them as privileges to which
they are entitled. Not only
have people no ambition to
learn ; they consider it a
loss of status when they
have to learn. People who
wish to keep their status
hire Chinese to do things
for them. It needs familiar
contact with the "barbar-
ians" to bring out the fact
that the serene Chinese
contempt for the barbarian
is quite equaled by the contempt of the barbarian for the Chinese.
In this connection it is illuminating to consider the attitude
of these peoples to the West, to which they have never stood in a
position of privilege. It is congruent with the fact that historically
the importance of Chinese culture in the transfrontier region has
been balanced by the strategic advantage of the frontiers over China.
Historically, the spread of Chinese culture has always been as
much a matter of what the barbarians felt like taking as of what the
Chinese felt it necessary to impose. These same "ignorant and un-
ambitious" Central Asians take to \\'estern "progress," of which
Russia is the disseminator, quite readily. Railways, motor cars, and
all things mechanical they regard with enthusiasm : anri tliis atti-
tude I believe is to be closely related to the fact that hisroncaliv
power and conquest have tended to come from the north and west.
Education, in a country living in the past, is not a matter of
obvious importance until the present breaks in on the past. For
both Moslems and Mongols, generally speaking, education means
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only religious education. The Chinese have their own schoofs, but
"higher education" has gained ground very slowly, though the num-
ber of men in the government services who have been educated
in modern schools and universities in China, or even abroad, is
gradually increasing.
The Chinese also maintain schools, of no very high quality, for
educating "natives"' on Chinese lines. It is a regular characteristic
of the Chinese that petty merchants learn the languages of the sub-
ject peoples, while officials do not. Thus, on the whole, the Chinese
practice is the reverse of that of Western nations which rule in
the Orient. The Chinese administrator knows and cares little about
the language, life, customs, and point of view of the people he
governs. He works through a "native" interpreter who can speak
Chinese. This leads to a great deal of corruption, but is not al-
together to the disadvantage of the Chinese. Local resentment is
likely to be directed first against the interpreters and headmen who
are in immediate contact, and can often be mollified by punishment
of an underling. On the other hand it damages Chinese prestige in
one important respect. It is the common opinion of the "natives"
that "the Chinese books are full of all wisdom, and the way to get
rich and powerful is to model yourself on the Chinese ; but also the
Chinese must be the most corrupt people in the world, for all who
have anything to do with them become oppressors, thieves, and
liars." This does not matter so much as long as Chinese prestige
remains high. The Central Asian peoples tend to think that op-
pression is the chief function of any ruler, native or alien ; but when
another power begins to rise in prestige, resentment against the
Chinese can easily be exploited.
Chinese Turkistan, then, is a country in which the geographical
distribution of peoples and types of economy, the relation of
settled oasis populations to nomads, and of the Chinese culture to the
patchwork of the native cultures, as inherited from a long history
of slow development but strongly established pattern, are plainly
reflected in the asjiect of the present. The influence of inherited
relationshi])s and antagonisms remains important largely because
isolation, distance, and imperfect communications deaden the impact
of new forces and ideas. The bitterest hostilities and local wars,
when they break out, are not yet related to the clash between new
civilization and old, as they are so generally in the rest of the
Rast, but are still generated primarily by ancient incompatibilities
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between nomad and peasant, between Moslem and non-Moslem,
and between one Moslem sect and another.
Chinese rule, though successful as an expedient, has not been able
to free itself from the cycle of Central Asian history. Its own sta-
bility and success are now gradually producing a tension that must
break down in war and rebellion. Its most important phenomenon
is one that must often have been seen in the past—expansion from
the South Road oases into the regions of the North Road. Such an
expansion is inevitably produced by a long period of tranquil
government, especially when it represents the power of the "civi-
lized" over the "uncivilized." Agriculture creates a denser popula-
tion and a larger and more easily collected tax-revenue ; and the
government always knows where the people are. A nomadic popu-
lation always tends toward tribal loyalties, and the tribal leaders
are less easily supervised than village headmen.
The lack of a free supply of colonists from the outside (from
China) reduces colonization to a shifting of population within the
province. A few Chinese come in from Kansu, but most of the
colonists are T'ung-kan from the Urumchi-Manas region moving
farther west, or Turki cultivators crossing over from the oases
of the South Road. Some of the colonization is directed toward oases
that have been depopulated since the Moslem insurrections of the
late nineteenth century ; but the nomads are also affected, and are
decidedly resentful.
It is commonly said of colonization at the expense of nomads
that they have plenty of spare land. In Central Asia and in many
parts of Mongolia, this is not true. The severity of the climate
makes prosperous nomadic life possible only if good, sheltered win-
tering-grounds are available. This is responsible for a remarkable
difference in the summer and winter relations between nomadic
tribes ; notably between the Kazaks as one main group and the ]\Ion-
gols as another. In summer they scatter out over wide grazing
grounds, and raid each others' herds. In winter, the lack of good
quarters drives them in close to each other ; a tacit truce is declared,
and they spend the winter in comparative amity.
Not only Chinese officials going out to survey land for coloniza-
tion grants, but foreign travelers also, usually visit the nomads in
summer. Thus, the universal report is of vast ranges of pasture
with a very thin population. The scarcity of good winter quarters
is not given proper attention. Now it is these very winter-quarter
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valleys, because they are sheltered, that first attract the colonist.
The nomads, therefore, feel pinched in and oppressed much earlier
than is generally supposed.
Then again, many enthusiasts of colonization would like to see
settlement from the outside reinforced by conversion of the nomads
themselves to agricultural life. Popular theory argues that agricul-
tural economy is a "higher form of civilization" than nomadic life,
and innocently assumes that the nomads will be "attracted by the
opportunities of progress." This, so far as Chinese colonization is
concerned, is a complete fallacy. The central characteristic of all
the nomad peoples in contact with China is that, far from looking
up to China, they look down on the Chinese. This historic truth
has been unduly obscured by the standard histories, which dwell on
the sinization of the l)arbarian invaders of China and neglect the
fact that throughcnU histnry real j^ower tended to reside in the
hands of those barbarians who remained outside the Great Wall,
to breed fresh contingents of conquerors.
The traditional attitude remains strong; even in periods like the
present when, owing solely to the accident that the Chinese have
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more modern arms than the nomads, the nomads are weak in rela-
tion to China. They still prefer to avoid the Chinese, not to "raise
themselves to the Chinese level." This is proved conclusively by
the fact that wherever nomads, in contact with the Chinese, settle
down to agriculture and the Chinese way of life, it is always and
only the feckless and unenterprising, or the helpless, who settle
down ; and in so doing they earn the contempt, not the respect or
admiration, of their fellows. It is not the rich, the socially superior,
those best able to "appreciate the advantages of the higher civili-
zation," who embrace the chance of "progress." These, on the
contrary, are the people who keep up most doggedly their pride
in the ancient wav of life, who refuse to the last possible moment
to compromise, and who form the backbone of those last bitter re-
bellions that either turn back the process of colonization or end in
the extinction of the nomads. Another little-known proof of the
high standing of the nomadic life is the fact that a certain number
of the immigrants, notably among the Turki, abandon the settled
life in favor of the nomad life.
It is the eternal tragedy of China that all the peoples of the
barrier-regions of the northern and northwestern frontiers face
inward on China. The rhythm of their history has been determined
from of old as an alternation of advance and retreat, with their faces
toward China. It is virtually impossible to convert them to face
about and take part in Chinese expansion. The complementary as-
pect of this historical bias is that Mongols and Central Asian peoples
have always tended to accord prestige and admiration more readily
to Russia than to China. It is demonstrably true that the Rus-
sians are more successful even in converting nomads to agricul-
ture than are the Chinese. This has been true even in the past, al-
though the Russian expansion in Siberia was marked by bitter con-
flicts with different tribes ; it is more true in the present, because
even the small degree of mechanization in Russian farming gives
an appeal that China cannot offer.
Above all, the radical difference in character between Russian
and Chinese agriculture is important. The wooden plow and in-
tensive cultivation of the Chinese have never been regarded as any-
thing but the marks of slaves and subject peoples ; but it is possible
to accept the superior plows and extensive cultivation of the
Russians as worthy of free men. The intensive Chinese agricul-
ture is bound ud with a social order which is never successful with-
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out close settlement, crowded villages, and frequent towns. The
extensive Russian agriculture is possible in isolated wilderness
settlements with mixed pastoral and agricultural economy, which
makes much easier the transition from nomadic life. In Chinese
Turkistan, the very regions where a long period of peaceful
Chinese rule has brought out the old opposition between oasis and
free pasture are the regions which lie more open to Russia than to
China, and the peoples afifected are related in blood, language, and
religion to peoples who, under Russian rule, have been granted re-
publics of their own and encouraged (perhaps as a distraction from
the drawbacks of rigid economic control) to take pride in strong
local nationalism.
The immemorial Chinese practice in dealing with "natives" is
to work through their chiefs. In times of barbarian ascendancy the
best way of minimizing the impact is to bargain with separate chiefs.
In times of Chinese ascendancy the best method of preventing
barbarian unity is to favor the chiefs against one another in rotation.
In recent years, however, the lack of obvious resistance and the
success in maintaining the continuity of Chinese rule at the time of
the revolution and again after the murder of Governor Yang a
few years ago—both obvious occasions for native insurrection
—
have encouraged the feeling that the natives are no longer dangerous.
Success in Chinese colonization, notably in Mongolia and Alan-
churia, gave rise to a conviction that the day of the barbarian was
finally over. The Kuomintang urged that the time had come to
set about the business of making all natives either turn Chinese or
get out. The Kuomintang has but little political powder in Chinese
Turkistan, because the ruling Chinese faction, as has been pointed
out, can only maintain itself by keeping free of commitments to
political factions in China. Nevertheless, the general cast of thought
which the Kuomintang represents has been spreading.
During the long period of strong rule, the privileges and sub-
sidies of the native Turki "princes," who had once been at the head
of "native states" in a number of the southern oases, had been
either cut down or abolished. Even on the Xnrth Road the powers
of the K'nzak chiefs and Mongi)! ])rinces were being ])rogressivcly
curtailed. The only im])orlant surviving "native state" in the south
was that of Ilanii (Koniun. In l')20 it was decided to discontinue
the "native state" administration and substitute the ordinary form
of Chinese administration. It is ])rol)able that the \-ear 1*^2*^ marks
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the peak of Chinese expansion in Manchuria, Mongolia, Central
Asia, and Tibet.
When an attempt was made to remeasure lands for taxation pur-
poses, a rebellion broke out among- the mountaineers who are the
outlying subjects of the ITami {principality. It rapidly became so
serious that Chinese authority throughout the province was im-
periled. There was a danger of risings all over the province. The
very inferior troops of the standing army were incapable of putting
down the insurrection, and for the first time the practice of using
Mongols against Moslems was inadequate. The Chinese met the
situation by an application extraordinary of the old principle of
using one subject race to hold down another. They enlisted "White"
Russians—non-Soviet exiles and refugees—in the Hi region, turned
over to them the arms of the regular troops, transported them to
Hami, and with them put down the uprising: though it still smolders
in the mountains.
With the outbreak of the Hami trouble, the present regime in
Chinese Turkistan passed its peak. There is now more banditry
—
in a province notalily free of banditry—than ever before, and it is
closely associated with racial trouble. Increased efforts are now be-
ing made to renew contact with China, in spite of the known dan-
ger of implication in civil wars, and this weakening of the old con-
fident isolation probably means a loss of conviction in their own
sufficiency among the ruling minority.
What, then, is the present state of Chinese Turkistan? The
Chinese, after prolonged contact, have not amalgamated with the
native population. Nor has Chinese culture penetrated deeply. It
remains an alien veneer, affecting onlv a limited number of activi-
ties and a small proportion of the people. Chinese political and
military supremacy, long a fiction, but a fiction handled with emi-
nent skill and functioning well as a working theory, is in danger
of collapse. The province is an insecure salient in the line of the
frontier; and China itself, in the eyes of many of the subject
peoples, appears to be crumbling inward on its own center.
The position of Chinese Central Asia can hardly be clarified
without catastrophe. For more than a generation it has been com-
pletely occupied in a cycle of its own history of the immemorial
cast ; controled by an outside power, under title of conquest, but
actually ruled by manipulation of one native element against an-
other. In the days of the Silk Route, the Han dynasty asserted
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its power chiefly by negotiation among the petty Central Asian
states, while the silk trade, passing through, was more an affair
of resident alien trading communities than of the desert-isolated
oasis-dwellers themselves. Religions from India and the Near East
were later imported ; the costumes and languages of many lands
and nations became familiar, but the basic forms of life altered
little. The rhythm of history grew out of the relation of oasis to
desert and mountain, of caravan route to migration route, and
through it ran also the ebb and flow of the power of the Border
over China, and of China over the Border.
So, in our own time, the affairs of nations have passed over the
heads of nomads and oasis-dwellers. For them the great affairs of
the world have been the creeping extension of Chinese control, re-
flected in the decline of native princes and rulers, the spread of
oasis-life into the traditional domain of the nomads, the balance
between ^Moslem and Mongol, and the rivalries of the sects which
forever rend the ^Moslem world internally. They have said, in ef-
fect, of the alien civilization of China, "It is true, there are such
things" ; of India, "Alen have been there, and returned" •. of Russia,
"Men speak of wonders."
Yet all the while the relative position of this Inner Asian world
has been altering. Alien forces have been crowding closer to it.
They have artificially been held back, and therefore, when they
do break in, the effect of the shock will be all the more like the
foundering of one world and the creation, in agony, of another.
The apprehensive efforts of the Chinese in Sin-kiang to renew^ con-
tact with China, and the important modern movement in China it-
self to stimulate expansion into the northwest, appear to be only
echoes of the probably more important fact that real Chinese power
on the frontier is more unstable than at any time since the revolu-
tion. Political, financial, and physical difficulties impede the exten-
sion of railway approach toward Chinese Central .\sia. A turbu-
lent Moslem population in Kansu stands like an "Inner Mongolia"
between China and the "Outer Mongolia" of Chinese Turkistan.
Xor can the Chinese in Sin-kiang ol^tain a free supply of the
modern arms which might refresh their title to rule. To attempt to
import tlu-m from China would be to ])rc'scnt them to some mili-
tarist on the way ; nor could they be imported through Russia or
India without some compensation of the kind that one government
considers appropriate from another.
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In Russian Central Asia, on the other hand, the drift toward
Chinese Turkistan is inexorable. The political-economic and social-
economic movements there demand extension into Chinese Turki-
stan if they are to fulfil themselves. Certain important irrigation
projects in Kazakistan cannot be undertaken unless they are based
on works constructed on the Hi River in Chinese territory. The
Turk-Sib railway, flanking the whole western frontier of Chinese
Turkistan, has confirmed its economic orientation toward the Union
of Socialist Soviet Republics.
Thus, when the forces of the new world do at last break in on
Chinese Central Asia, it is almost inevitable that they will enter
raw, strong and overwhelming from the Russian side instead of
in a graduated, attenuated, and semi-Chinese form from the Chinese
side. The internal history of Chinese Turkistan shows an alter-
nating interaction between the oases of the south and the "land of
free movement" of the north. It is likely that a period of oasis as-
cendancy is ending and that the alternate period historically repre-
senting nomad ascendancy will be transformed into an inrush from
the North Road, comparable to the old nomad descents in form,
but infused with a new and strange vigor and many unknown
qualities derived from Russian Central Asia.
